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The establishment in 1904 of a British hospital at Gyantse, in southwestern Tibet,
marked the formal introduction of biomedicine into that Himalayan state. In the ensuing
decades, officers of the Indian Medical Service (IMS)
1 offered treatment to Tibetans from
their Gyantse base as a part of the British imperial relationship with the Tibetan state.
Given that Gyantse was a small town of little political or economic importance, the
medical impact of the IMS dispensary on Tibet as a whole was insignificant. But it
provided a base from which in 1936–37 the British expanded their medical services to
establish a hospital in Lhasa, the Tibetan capital. In the 1940s the Republican, and later the
Communist Chinese governments also established biomedical hospitals in Lhasa, and
while the indigenous medical system(s) of Tibet survived, the urban centres of central
Tibet have had access to biomedicine since that time. Thus the history of the first perma-
nentbiomedicalpositioninTibetisapartofthemedicalhistoryofboththeBritishimperial
government in South Asia and of Tibet itself.
Wearefortunateinthatthispioneeringimperialmedicalendeavourwasofsuchpolitical
importance at the time that it produced a considerable amount of official correspondence,
which was preserved in the imperial archives. These sources not only provide evidence for
the scope of, and the processes surrounding, the British imperial medical project in early
twentieth-century South Asia but also give indications of the indigenous reactions to this
initiative.
2
In this paper I discuss the establishment of the Gyantse hospital and locate in a wider
context the issues that arose there during the first five years of its existence down to 1910.
Within that brief period, the principal features of the biomedical encounter with Tibet
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The terms ‘‘Tibetan medicine’’ and ‘‘biomedicine’’ are
both problematic. The former embraces a wide variety
of practices and understandings and, while including
an e ´lite textual tradition, should not be taken as
implying a unified system (although the British tended
to see it in such terms). ‘‘Biomedicine’’ is used
ratherthanthemorepopularterm‘‘Westernmedicine’’
in order to emphasize the basis of the system following
the scientific advances of the later nineteenth
century.
1The Indian Medical Service was formed in 1896
from the amalgamation of the Bengal, Madras and
Bombay Medical Services. It was originally a purely
European cadre whose officers were required to be
qualified medical practitioners.
2A study of the Tibetan sources on this process,
which are now becoming available to European
scholarship, is obviously needed for a more balanced
understanding of those reactions.
135emerged, with a selective Tibetan uptakeof elements ofthe new system atthe sametime as
resistance to other aspects of biomedicine became evident. As with the political encounter
betweenTibetandtheimperialGovernmentofIndia,initialBritishoptimismgavewaytoa
more realistic understanding of the requirements of a long-term encounter.
The Birth of a Clinic
Diplomatic relations between the British imperial Government of India and its northern
neighbour were established in 1904, after the ‘‘Younghusband mission’’ had invaded Tibet
andfoughtitswaytoLhasa.TheTibetans hadpreviouslysoughttoisolatethemselvesfrom
the British, perceptively fearing that contacts with the imperial power would undermine
their socio-political religious system. But the imperial Government sought to extend
British influence across the Himalayan watershed, both to open Tibet to Indian trade
and to protect the Indian empire against any threat of Russian influence from the
north. Thus, when the Tibetans had rejected all British diplomatic overtures, the Viceroy
ofIndia,LordCurzon, despatchedthearmed missionunderthediplomaticcommandofthe
Indian Political Officer, Francis Younghusband, which forced the Tibetans to sign a treaty
opening their state to British trade and diplomatic overtures.
A permanent British–Indian diplomatic presence was then established in Tibet as
Younghusband’s forces withdrew in September 1904. A so-called ‘‘Trade Agency’’
was opened, which was in fact a diplomatic mission staffed by, and under the control
of, imperial India’s diplomatic service, the Foreign and Political Department. The Trade
Agency came under the direct control of a British Political Officer stationed in the
Sikkimese capital of Gangtok, who was also responsible for British India’s relations
with Sikkim and Bhutan, which were, in effect, ‘‘Princely States’’ ruled by indigenous
e ´lites under ultimate British authority.
In deference to Tibetan desires for isolation, however, the imperial Agency was estab-
lished not in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, but in Gyantse, 120 miles south-west of
the capital. The first British agent to be posted there was Younghusband’s Intelligence
Officer and ‘‘right-hand man’’ on the mission to Lhasa, Captain (later Lieutenant-Colonel)
W F O’Connor. An astute, Tibetan-speaking officer, O’Connor already had a decade’s
experience of intelligence gathering on India’s northern frontiers.
3
The duty of a Political Officer under the imperial government system was to establish
friendly personal relations with the indigenous state authorities and thus to influence them
to follow policies advantageous to British imperial interests. O’Connor thus set out to
befriend the Tibetan e ´lites, using a variety of means to demonstrate British goodwill in the
aftermath of the conflicts arising from the Younghusband mission.
Experience elsewhere in the Indian empire meant the British recognized that one simple
and economic, yet highly effective means of developing good relations with the Tibetans
was by providing them with free medical treatment. Western medical knowledge
had enjoyed some repute amongst Tibetans since at least the early eighteenth century,
when Capuchin missionaries had opened a medical clinic in Lhasa. The Tibetans
subsequently barred missionaries from entering their territory, but during the nineteenth
3Regarding the establishment and history of the
British positions in Tibet, see Alex McKay, Tibet and
the British Raj: the frontier cadre 1904–1947,
Richmond (UK), Curzon, 1997.
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Alex McKaycentury a chain of Christian mission stations was established around the frontier, where
medical services were offered as a (largely unsuccessful) means of attracting Tibetans to
Christianity.
4
In addition to the missionaries, a number of Europeans who travelled in or around Tibet
offered medical services as a means of ingratiating themselves with their hosts, and there
are indications that political and commercial interests were promoting Western pharma-
ceutical products in Tibet by at least the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
5 Russian
influence was also a factor. The Russian Buddhist republics were an avenue for the
penetration of European medical knowledge into Tibet as well as being the main route
for the well-known traffic in medical knowledge from Tibet to Russia, where Tibetan
medicine was much in vogue by the early twentieth century.
6
Tibetans themselves encountered institutional biomedicine as they travelled to places
such as Peking and Calcutta for trade and pilgrimage. In addition, individual Tibetan
medical practitioners may already have begun incorporating aspects of biomedical knowl-
edge and practices into their own understanding. Certainly a demand existed within Tibet
for items such as smallpox vaccine.
7
DuringtheYounghusbandmission,imperialmedicalstaffhadtreatedTibetanswounded
in the fighting against them and had offered free medical services to any Tibetans wanting
them. These actions do seem to have created a great impression among the local people,
both because battlefield casualties in that region were traditionally at best ignored and at
worst slaughtered, and because Tibet at that time lacked any civil or military medical
service in the European sense.
While the natural environment of Tibet was a healthy one, in which the extreme cold
meant an absence of malarial infection and of many of the water-borne diseases that
4A comprehensive account of these missionary
activities is a lacuna in the field, but there are a number
of studies of particular missions; in the English
language, see for example, Fulgentius Vannini, The
Bell of Lhasa, New Delhi, 1976; John Bray, ‘Christian
missions and the politics of Tibet, 1850–1950’,
in W Wagner (ed.), Kolonien und Missionen, Bremen
(Universit€ a at),1993,pp.180–95.Theclassicstudyofthe
Capuchins is Luciano Petech, I missionari italiani
nel Tibet e nel Nepal (Il Nuovo Ramusio II), 7 vols,
Rome, ISMEO, 1952–1956.
5According to J€ u urgen Aschoff’s comprehensive
Annotated bibliography of Tibetan medicine (1789–
1995), Dietikon, Garuda Verlag, 1996, entry 1559,
EEUktomsky’sRussianlanguagework‘Fromthefield
of Lamaism. On the campaign of the British to Tibet’,
St Petersburg, 1904, p. 66, describes Dr Campbell,
appointed imperial Superintendent of Darjeeling in
1839, as ‘‘responsible for sanitary imports’’ into
Tibet. See also note 6.
6Samjamitab Tsybiktarov (1877–1921), the first
Buriat trained in biomedicine, for example, was
attached to the Russian consulate in Urga (Mongolia),
which had close ties with Tibet. I am indebted to
Dr Alex Andreyev (St Petersburg) for this information,
taken from a biographical sketch of Tsybiktarov
by Sh. B Chimitdorjiev. On the institution of Tibetan
medicine in Russia in this period, see John Snelling,
Buddhism in Russia: the story of Agvan Dorzhiev,
Lhasa’s emissary to the Tsar, Shaftsbury (UK),
Element Books, 1993, pp. 85–9.
7In the early 1880s, the Bengali headmaster and
imperial intelligence agent Sarat Chandra Das took
smallpoxvaccineto Tibetat the request ofthe Panchen
Lama; for an examination of this initiative in its
wider context, see Alex McKay, ‘The drowning of
Lama SengchenKyabying: a preliminaryenquiryfrom
British sources’, in H Blezer (gen. ed.), Tibet Past and
Present: Tibetan Studies I. Proceedings of the
9
th International Seminar for Tibetan Studies,
Leiden, Brill, 2000, pp. 263–80, esp. pp. 266–7.
For an example of an individual Tibetan medical
practitioner acquiring biomedical knowledge in India,
seeVincanneAdamsandDashimaDovchin,‘Women’s
health in Tibetan medicine and Tibet’s ‘‘first’’ female
doctor’, in E B Findly (ed.), Women’s Buddhism,
Buddhism’s women: tradition, revision, renewal,
Boston, Wisdom Publications, 2000, pp. 433–59,
esp. p. 446; I am indebted to an anonymous Medical
History referee for this reference. While it relates to
a later period (1940s?), relevant Tibetan sources
(esp. gnam tars: religious biographies), are
only now beginning to appear in European
languages.
137
The IMS Dispensary in Gyantse (Tibet), 1904–1910ravaged India, the country was still subject to smallpox epidemics, child-mortality
was extremely high, and treatment of wounds was rudimentary. Contemporary medical
services in Tibet appear to have been provided by a variety of practitioners from domestic
and ‘‘village level’’ healers to monastic practitioners of the e ´lite Tibetan medical
system. An important role was also played by both oracular or shamanic healers and
by amchis, lay practitioners who had studied the traditions of a particular lineage of
medical teachings. Treatment could thus be from the Tibetan pharmacopoiea and/or
within the context of ‘‘magico-religious’’ healing, generally within a Buddhist rhetorical
framework.
8
The e ´lite medical tradition of Tibet—that commonly known today as ‘‘Tibetan
medicine’’—drew on a number of elements both indigenous and foreign. Its canonical
heart was the Gy€ u u Shi (the ‘‘Four Medical Tantras’’), a text regarded as a revelation of the
Medicine Buddha. Understood as being of Indian origin, it is more probably a Tibetan
compilation from the twelfth century drawing on a Sanskrit original. It includes, however,
Persian and Chinese as well as indigenous elements, testifying to the cosmopolitan
nature of earlier Tibetan medical understandings.
9
This e ´lite tradition was preserved within the medical institutions of the Tibetan socio-
religious system, in particular the Chakpori medical college, situated on a rock outcrop
oppositethePotalaPalaceinLhasa.Establishedin1696,itsgraduateswerepostedtomajor
monasteries throughout Tibet where they practised and taught the e ´lite traditions.
10 There
was, however, no public health system in the European understanding of the term and,
while there are accounts of the isolation of smallpox victims,
11 it is uncertain whether any
permanent systems of disease control existed in practice.
Scientific medical advances in the West, such as germ theory, were entirely unknown in
Tibet at that time and, without entering into the question of the efficacy of Tibetan medical
practices, it is safe to say that there was an enormous potential appeal for biomedicine
8The non-e ´lite medical traditions of Tibet have not
been subject to critical historical study, as far as
I am aware. Two significant anthropological studies
that might form a basis for such work are: Craig Janes,
‘The transformations of Tibetan medicine’, Med.
Anthropol.Q.,1995,9(1):6–39;andVincanneAdams,
‘Modesofproductionandmedicine:anexamination of
the theory in light of Sherpa medical traditionalism’,
Soc. Sci. Med., 1988, 27: 505–13.
9Galenic medicine had reached Tibet in an even
earlier period; see Christopher Beckwith, ‘The
Introduction of Greek medicine into Tibet in the
seventh and eighth centuries’, J. Am. Orient. Soc.,
1979, 99: 297–313.
10On the e ´lite medical culture of Tibet, see, for
example, Rechung Rinpoche, Tibetan Medicine;
illustrated in original texts, London, Wellcome
Trust, 1973. The ‘‘official’’ view of Tibetan medicine
today is concisely contained on the website of the
Tibetan Government-in-exile (www.tibet.com).
Critical studies of the subject are rare; see however,
Samten Karmay, ‘Vairocana and the rGyud-bzhi’,
Tibetan medicine, series 12, 1989, Dharamsala (India),
pp. 19–31.
11For example, William Rockhill, Tibet: a
geographical, ethnographical and historical sketch,
derived from Chinese sources, London, 1891, p. 235,
quoting from the Hsi Ts’ang fu, p. 28, states that
‘‘In 1794, the Tale ´ [Dalai] lama, under orders from
the Emperor, erected special hospitals for small-pox
patients, in which they were supplied with
food and every necessary, and which were under
the care of a special officer’’. Rockhill’s Land of the
lamas, London, Longmans, Green, 1891, p. 242,
however, states that these fell into disuse.
The grave lack of critical studies impairs our
ability to present a realistic picture of the Tibetan
medical system(s) in the pre-1950 period;
European observers provide valuable observations,
but aside from the question of bias, their
investigations were far from systematic. Most
modern Western accounts of Tibetan medical
practice at best relate the idealized Tibetan Buddhist
sources and while there is no reason to doubt the
compassionate and humanitarian motives of medical
practitioners highlighted in these sources,
they surely represent only one element of the
system.
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Alex McKaythere, particularly if those services were offered free of charge, as British biomedical
treatment was.
By 1905, the principal contours of modern biomedical understanding had been estab-
lished; the role of bacteria was known and the need for antiseptic conditions in surgery
accepted. Anaesthetics were available, as well as vaccines against typhoid, plague and
smallpox, and the physicians’ use of stethoscopes, thermometers and microscopes was
standard. The doctors posted to Gyantse in this period were recent graduates in touch with
the rapid advances in science and biomedicine. But many of those advances would have
been of little relevance to a remote dispensary such as Gyantse, which had no laboratory or
x-ray facilities, and the doctors’ training in tropical medicine would have been of little
relevance on the Tibetan plateau.
12
The practice of biomedicine at Gyantse between 1905 and 1910 was thus ‘‘rough and
ready’’, although in line with the ‘‘generalist’’ ideal of the IMS officers and their frontier
setting. Only in surgical performance might a doctor there really distinguish himself in the
medical sense and the unsanitary conditions made even basic surgery problematic. But the
IMS officers were in no doubt that even their rudimentary biomedical services were
superior to the indigenous offerings, and that the free provision of medical services
would be greatly appreciated by the Tibetans.
Yet, aside from issues of efficacy, even the question of ‘‘free medicine’’ in the Tibetan
understandingisproblematic. While Tibetan religious biographies docontain references to
physicianswhogavefreetreatmenttotheneedy,
13itappearsthatinTibet(asintheWest)it
was the accepted custom to pay for medical treatment. Certainly European accounts
suggest that, as the eighteenth-century Jesuit Ippolito Desideri described, ‘‘Medicine is
the only profession which has qualified members ...The professors are well paid and
generally stipulate what their fee is to be before undertaking a cure’’. But Desideri goes on
to note that while the Capuchins did not charge fees, they did accept ‘‘any present which is
offered’’.
14 The British doctors were also offered (and accepted) ‘‘presents’’, generally in
the form of foodstuffs, and given the virtual absence of a cash economy this may very well
have been understood by Tibetans as payment for medical services.
The British do not appear to have considered this perspective, however, for they had
little knowledge of, or interest in, the Tibetan medical system(s) and no consequent
understanding of such matters.
15 The viceroyalty of Lord Curzon marked the high tide
of the British Indian empire and the IMS officers reflected the self-assurance of that
empire, operating in complete confidence in the superiority of their own medical system
and its efficacy in comparison with indigenous Asian systems.
12W F Bynum, Science and the practice of
medicine in the nineteenth century, Cambridge
University Press, 1994, esp., pp. 100–1, 121–3,
137–9, 161, 173; Christopher Lawrence, Medicine in
the making of modern Britain 1700–1920, London and
New York, Routledge, 1994, esp., pp. 64–7, 73.
13See, for example, Adams and Dovchin, op. cit.,
note 7 above, p. 446; see also Rechung Rinpoche,
op. cit., note 10 above, p. 25, on free medical
services at the Men-se Khang (sMan-rtsis-khang).
Both references relate, however, to a later
period.
14F de Filippi (ed.), An account of Tibet: the
travels of Ippolito Desideri of Pistoia, S.J.,
1712–1727, London, Routledge, 1932, pp. 186–87.
15None of the British Medical Officers
who served in Tibet, or even Sikkim and
Darjeeling, appear to have published any studies of
Tibetan medicine, nor does there appear to have
been a standard work on the system available
to them. A few comments by travellers such as Sarat
Chandra Das probably comprised the sum
total of their knowledge of the subject in this
early period.
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The IMS Dispensary in Gyantse (Tibet), 1904–1910In the early years of the British period in India Political Officers travelling or stationed
in remote areas were normally accompanied by a medical practitioner whose primary
task was to ensure the good health of the Political Officer. By the twentieth century the
goodwill obtained by the provision of biomedical services to the indigenous peoples, both
e ´lites and non-e ´lites, was widely recognized by the imperial policy-makers as beneficial
to the diplomatic success of the Political Officer’s missions.
16 Thus the Medical Officers
accompanying Political Officers devoted most of their time to treating the local peoples.
They were entitled to charge fees for private consultations with the local e ´lites,
17 but
gave their services gratis to the generalpopulace atclinics attached to political agencies, or
in camps set up while travelling.
It was, therefore, standard practice when in October 1904 after O’Connor was left in
Gyantse as the British diplomatic representative, a large house near the bazaar was rented
for use as a hospital and a Medical Officer, Captain Robert Steen, was stationed there.
18
The son of a landowner, Steen was born in Ulster in 1874 and educated at Queen’s College
Belfast, before taking his medical degree at the Royal University of Ireland. Steen, who
eventually retired with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, presumably impressed O’Connor
while serving on the Younghusband mission, and during his two years in Tibet worked
closely with his fellow Ulsterman.
19
The friendly relationship between O’Connor and Steen was important because there
were several issues of authority that could threaten the relationship between the political
agent and the Medical Officer. The first was that although the political role of the hospital
was the reason for the appointment of a European Medical Officer, the hospital had
originally been established as a military post. This meant that the Medical Officer
there was technically charged only with serving the fifty soldiers of the Indian
Army who acted as the Trade Agent’s escort. While praising Steen’s willingness to act
in the additional political role, O’Connor noted that another officer succeeding Steen
would be within his rights to refuse to undertake non-military duties. O’Connor thus
proposed bringing the hospital under Political Department authority, as was the case in
British political agencies elsewhere.
20 When the proposal was accepted, and the Gyantse
positioncontinuedonanewadministrativebasis,Steencarriedonthere,havingtransferred
from military to civil employment with a reference from O’Connor that stated that he
[Steen] was ‘‘wonderfully popular with all classes of natives’’.
21
16‘‘It is a well known principle that medical
officers are attached to our Consulates and Agencies
in remote localities primarily on account of
political considerations’’. National Archives of
India (New Delhi) [hereafter, NAI], Foreign
Department [hereafter, FD] External A, Sept. 1906,
40–46, File note by ‘‘R.S.B. & R.W.S.’’,
29 May 1906.
17The differing facilities offered to local e ´lites
were justified on the grounds that ‘‘The better
class of people naturally dislike mingling with the
poorer classes in hospital’’. Oriental and India
Office Collection (London) [hereafter OIOC]
L/P&S/7/229–923, Dispensary report attached to
Gyantse Annual Report [hereafter GAR],
1 April 1908–31 March 1909.
18The house was subsequently described as
‘‘a very unsuitable building, impossible to keep
clean, dark and ill-ventilated’’. OIOC L/P&S/
7/241–1058, GAR, 1 April 1909–31 March 1910.
19Dirom Crawford, The Roll of the Indian
Medical Service 1615–1930, London, W Thacker,
1930, p. 509; NAI FD, 1912 Establishment B,
Jan. 38, application for employment by Captain Steen.
20NAI FD, External A, Sept. 1906, 40–46,
WFO’ConnortoGovernmentofIndia,29March1906.
21NAI FD, 1912 Establishment B, Jan. 38,
application for employment by Captain Steen.
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Alex McKaySteen’s popularity was an important consideration. His political superiors considered
that while the efficacy of biomedicine and its free provision themselves enhanced the
British reputation, ‘‘the right type’’ of doctor could do ‘‘a tremendous lot for British
prestige’’.
22 One characteristic of the ‘‘right type’’ of officer was his ability to befriend
the local people, for that personal relationship was regarded as the basis from which to
enhance British diplomatic relations with the local state.
Thus, while Steen was stationed in Gyantse as a Medical Officer, his primary role there
was actually a political one.
23 This close relationship between the medical and political
roles of the European officers in Tibet was most clearly demonstrated by the career of
Lieutenant (later Lieutenant-Colonel) Robert Kennedy, who served as Medical Officer in
Gyantse from October 1907 to March 1910. By that time Tibet had ceased to be an
important issue in British Indian diplomacy, which meant that ambitious Political Officers
did not want to be posted there. From June to December 1909, in the absence of a suitable
diplomatic candidate for the position as Gyantse Trade Agent, Lieutenant Kennedy com-
bined the political role with his medical duties.
24
The political nature of the Gyantse post was clearly understood by all parties involved in
the British endeavour. Francis Younghusband had supported the establishment of a
Gyantse dispensary precisely because it was ‘‘extremely desirable on political grounds’’
25
and as O’Connor explained:
Although the medical officer at Gyantse originally received his orders from the military authorities
and is still nominally in [medical] charge only of a small detachment of native troops at Gyantse, it
was from the first considered desirable that a medical officer should remain at Gyantse more from
political than for military reasons. Ordinarily no medical officer would be required with so small a
detachment as 50 men ...but as it was clear that Gyantse was being occupied entirely for a political
purpose and not as a military post, and as the Foreign Department was establishing a British Officer
in civil employment as their Trade Agent at that place, and as the ministrations of a medical officer
were known to have a high political value, it seemed only right that an officer of the medical service
should be left at Gyantse to carry on the work ... with an eye far more to the political than
the military exigencies of the case.
26
The political goodwill obtained by Steen’s services was described by O’Connor in the
following fashion:
Our experience in Tibet throughout the [Younghusband] Mission and since has proved conclusively
the valuable political effect produced by the medical treatment of the natives of the country by our
doctors. It is a revelation to a backward ignorant race like the Tibetans to find that their conquerors
carry humanity to such an extent as to provide them with free medical attendance, and that such
marvellous cures can be effected (as for instance of cataract, etc) in the cases of diseases and
disfigurements which they regarded as incurable and permanent.
27
22NAI FD, 1904 Secret E, Feb., 1398–1445,
file note by Francis Younghusband, 4 Nov. 1904.
23The term ‘‘political’’ is used here in the British
Indian sense, as pertaining to relations with states
bordering the territory of the Government of India.
It thus equates to the term ‘‘diplomatic’’.
24Kennedy left Tibet in March 1910, being
succeeded as Gyantse Medical Officer by
Captain D M C Church, who remained there until
June 1911.
25NAI FD, External B, March 1906, 19–31, file
note by Francis Younghusband, 4 Nov. 1904 [sic].
26NAI FD, External A, Sept. 1906, 40–46,
W F O’Connor to Government of India, Foreign
Department, 25 March 1906.
27Ibid.
141
The IMS Dispensary in Gyantse (Tibet), 1904–1910So the British were satisfied that the Tibetans appreciated both the efficacy of biomedicine
and the generosityof those offering it toall whoasked.They judged that thisresultedin the
Tibetans taking a positive view of the British, and thus that the Tibetans were likely
ultimately to prove more co-operative in the political and diplomatic sphere as a result
oftheBritishmedicalinitiatives.ThatindividualTibetans appreciatedthe provisionoffree
biomedical services cannot be in doubt, but the question of whether this resulted in British
success in the diplomatic sphere is a complex one that must be located in the wider context
of the Tibetan encounter with modernity. Anglo-Tibetan diplomatic relations did improve
after the expulsion of the Chinese in 1912, but in the 1920s the Tibetan leadership rejected
virtually all aspects of Western modernity in an unsuccessful attempt to preserve their
religio-socialsystem.ThatdevelopmentvirtuallyendedanyBritishhopesofanindigenous




of the Indian Medical Service, a Hospital Assistant, a Compounder [of medicines], and a
khalassi (dresser), along with a sweeper and a coolie. The status of the British officer was
clearly expressedin financial terms. He receivedan annual basic salary of 7,200 rupees per
annum, while the indigenous employees received 1,400rupees between them.
29 Medicines
were supplied to Gyantse by the Government of India, but financial considerations were
always paramount in its administration of the posts in Tibet, which meant that there could
be large discrepancies between the equipment and medicines requisitioned by the Gyantse
Medical Officers and the actual supplies received. In 1907, for example, a precise and
detailed list of sixty required specialist surgical items was submitted from Gyantse, but
a greatly simplified and considerably more economical list of fifteen items was actually
sanctioned.
30 Such economies must have impacted on the efficacy of biomedical practice
at Gyantse.
The British officers in Tibet and other Political Department postings filed annual reports
on the establishments under their jurisdiction, most of which have survived. The reports
from the hospital at Gyantse vary somewhat in regard to the details they record, but
collectively they do provide a valuable resource for the analysis of health conditions in
a distinct Himalayan location over a specific period of time.
The first report from Gyantse states that in the first ten months of the hospital’s exis-
tence, 58 operations were carried out under general anaesthesia, with one death recorded.
Respiratory and heart diseases were noted as being rare there, with much of the Medical
Officer’s workload consisting of treating wounds and accidents, although ‘‘boils, ulcers
and various diseases of the skin’’ are recorded as forming 23 per cent of all cases treated,
with venereal diseases forming 15 per cent of the total.
31 Unfortunately the report does not
28On the 1920s, see, in particular, Melvyn
Goldstein, A history of modern Tibet, 1913–1951:
the demise of the lamaist state, London, University of
California, 1989, passim; Alastair Lamb, Tibet, China,
andIndia1914–1950,Hertingfordbury,Roxford,1989,
passim; K Dhondup [sic], The water-bird and other
years,Delhi,RangwangPublications,1986,pp.64–92;
McKay, op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 102–18.
29NAI FD, External B, March 1906, 19–31, J C
White to Government of India, Foreign Department,
7 Jan. 1905.
30NAI FD, External B, Oct. 1907, 1–4, various
correspondence.
31OIOC MSS Eur F157–304b, GAR, 1906
[actually from Oct. 1904 to 31 March 1906].
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Alex McKayprovide the total number of cases treated, although Steen does record that a temporary
dispensary he opened for eight days while on a visit to the larger nearby town of Shigatse,
treated between 500 and 600 cases in that time.
32
In his Shigatse report, Steen noted the prevalence of eye diseases, which were among a
numberofconditionsthatcouldbeimprovedbyBritishsurgery.
33Therewasanindigenous
treatment for cataracts, but a later report states that ‘‘[m]any eyes are destroyed by the
native method of treatment (firing)’’,
34 and this was to be one area in which considerable
success was achieved by the British. As O’Connor had suggested, the restoration of
a patient’s sight had an immediate and lasting impact on local thinking, and thus was
valuable propaganda for the British system.
The annual dispensary report for 1906–7 records that the Gyantse hospital treated
369 patients, of whom 34 were inpatients, with 24 operations carried out. The principal
conditions treated were ‘‘general and local injuries’’, which totalled 60, syphilis, with
55 persons treated, and ulcers, which totalled 32 cases.
35 The figures for the 1907–8 period
are not available,
36 but the following year’s report indicates that 23 per cent of patients
were suffering from venereal diseases. While these were curable, the process was then a
lengthy one and the Tibetans proved unwilling to continue the treatment after the immedi-
ate symptoms had vanished.
37
In the 1909–10 report a total of 3,428 patients are listed as being treated, of whom
14.6 per cent were suffering from venereal diseases. A report was then submitted for the
period 1 April to 31 December 1910, after which the reports were submitted on the basis of
the calendar year. That abbreviated 1910 report breaks the figures down into two cate-
gories, outpatients, of whom 40 of 444 (9 per cent) were suffering from syphilis, and




The treatment of venereal diseases was to continue to be a mainstay of the Gyantse
Medical Officers’ workload. Their reports indicate that while the Chinese soldiers then in
Tibet made up a high percentage of those suffering from these conditions,
39 venereal
diseases were endemic in the country.
40 But the medical issue of greatest concern to
the Government of India at that time was not venereal disease but smallpox, for the
32Ibid.
33NAIFD,ExternalB,March1906,19–31,RSteen
to W F O’Connor, 28 Oct. 1904.
34OIOC L/P&S/7/249–1151, dispensary report for
theyearending31Dec.1911.Nodetailsofthe‘‘firing’’
technique (or other Tibetan medical techniques)
are given in British sources; Dr Alexander Hamilton,
who visited Tibet in the 1770s, described the
Tibetans as ‘‘entirely ignorant’’ of the structure of the
eye and the nature of cataracts, but more successful in
treating them than European doctors due to superior
instrumentation; see A Hamilton to G Bogle,
6 Nov. 1775, in A Lamb (ed.), Bhutan and Tibet:
the travels of George Bogle and Alexander
Hamilton 1774–1777; Vol. 1, Letters, journals and
memoranda, Hertingfordbury, Roxford Books,
2002, pp. 388–9.
35OIOC L/P&S/7/203–1162, GAR, 1 April 1906–
31 March 1907.
36The dispensary report for that period is not
attached to the GAR contained in L/P&S/7/220–1625.
37OIOC L/P&S/7/229–923, dispensary report for
the period 1 April 1908–31 March 1909.
38OIOC L/P&S/7/241–1058, dispensary report
for the period 1 April 1909–31 March 1910; L/P&S/7/
249–1151, dispensary report for the period ending
31 Dec. 1910.
39See, for example, OIOC L/P&S/7/249–1151,
dispensary report for the year ending 31 Dec. 1911.
40That conclusion, however, may testify more
to the efficacy of the biomedical treatment of venereal
diseases (particularly with the introduction of
Salvarsan around 1910), than actual disease rates. I
hope to explore this issue in greater depth in the future.
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The IMS Dispensary in Gyantse (Tibet), 1904–1910Indo-Tibetan trade routes were also routes by which epidemics could be carried across the
Himalayas by traders and pilgrims. A serious outbreak of smallpox in the year 1900–1 was
known to have devastated central Tibet, with 3,000 to 5,000 monks alone reported to have
died of the disease in Lhasa. The epidemic had then spread south, causing hundreds of
deaths in the Gyantse region. The Government of India had responded by closing the main
passes from central Tibet until arrangements were made to vaccinate all persons crossing
the frontier, an action which contributed to a significant slump in the cross-border trade
for that period.
41
By the early years of the twentieth century, the imperial medical authorities in India
had considerable experience in the implementation of smallpox vaccination campaigns.
42
They were acutely aware that vaccination potentially aroused cultural or other forms of
resistance, but its efficacy was undoubted. The benefits of its extension across the frontier
into Tibet were thus summarized by the Director-General of the Indian Medical Service:
‘‘Vaccination seems to be very desirable from a humanitarian point of view and will in
some degree protect our territory from the introduction of smallpox. It is also a means of
impressing the natives.’’
43
In this case, however, the fact that ‘‘the natives’’ were not citizens of British India was a
significant issue. Whereas the Political Officer responsible for the imperial government’s
relationswithSikkim,BhutanandTibetcould,toaverylargeextent,enforceBritishwillin
the former two states, Tibet was in no way a part of British India and remained outside his
authority (although the imperial frontier officers from Younghusband onwards sought to
establish greater British domain there). This meant that, whereas vaccination campaigns
quickly followed the introduction of British authority in Sikkim, and to a lesser extent
Bhutan (where, unlike Sikkim, there were no permanent European residents), the process
in Tibet was more sensitive. As a state outside British Indian authority, Tibet could not be
forced, but only encouraged to vaccinate its people.
The position was also complicated by the fact that despite Tibet’s semi-independent
status at that time, the Chinese claimed it as being a part of their empire, and one or two
Chinese ambans (diplomatic representatives) were stationed in Lhasa to enforce the
Emperor’s will. The British Government officially acknowledged that Chinese position,
and particularly in the period up to 1912–13, when all Chinese officials were expelled by
theTibetans,theGovernmentofIndiahadtodealwiththeChineseasthesuzerainpowerin
Tibet. This was not always easy, the Chinese were hostile to a British presence there, and
sought to undermine the authority of the British agents. As a part of that campaign they
argued that the British vaccination campaigns constituted impermissible interference in
Tibet’s internal affairs.
The value of vaccination against smallpox was, however, becoming known to the
Tibetans. During the Younghusband mission vaccination seems to have been offered to
41NAI FD, External B, May 1906, 156–158, J C
WhitetoGovernmentofIndia,5Feb.1906,andRSteen
to W F O’Connor, 14 Dec. 1905.
42Foranuanceddiscussionofsmallpoxvaccination
issues, see Sanjoy Bhattacharya, ‘Re-devising
Jennerian vaccines? European technologies,
Indian innovation and the control of smallpox in south
Asia, 1850–1950’, in B Pati and M Harrison (eds),
Health, medicine and empire: perspectives on
colonial India, Delhi, Orient Longman, 2001,
pp. 217–69.
43NAI FD, External B, May 1906, 156–158,
file note by G Bomford, 22 March 1906.
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Alex McKayany Tibetan who requested it. We know that this had some influence on the Himalayan
e ´lites,foramongYounghusband’spartywasthesoon-to-beKingofBhutan,whoactedasa
high-levelintermediaryonthemission.Hewasimpressedbyhisobservationsoftheresults
of biomedicine in general and vaccination in particular, later requesting that these be
introduced into Bhutan.
44 A similarly positive impression was presumably created in
the minds of at least some of the Tibetan peoples.
The support of local e ´lites was essential to the process of introducing vaccination in
areas outside the direct control ofthe Government of India—that is,the Princely States and
neighbouring regions. In both Sikkim and Bhutan the British had formed alliances with the
local rulers and gained their support for vaccination programmes. Thus they sought an
alliance with a similar figure of authority to promote vaccination in Tibet. Tibet’s ruler,
the Dalai Lama, had fled to Mongolia as Younghusband’s troops advanced on Lhasa, but
the British identified a suitable alternative candidate in the Panchen Lama, Tibet’s second
highestreligious figure.ThePanchenruledoverhiscourtinTibet’s secondbiggesttownof
Shigatse, a day’s ride from the British post at Gyantse, and in the immediate aftermath of
the Younghusband mission, O’Connor devoted considerable effort to befriending
the Panchen Lama. He spent much of his time in Shigatse rather than at Gyantse, and
succeeded in persuading the Panchen to visit India for three months in 1905–6. There he
soughttoensurethattheLamawastreatedwithconsiderablerespectwhileatthesametime
being impressed by the nature and extent of British power.
45
Among those accompanying the Panchen Lama in India was Captain Steen, and he
escorted the Panchen back to Shigatse on the return journey and remained there for several
weeks—presumably in case the Lama manifested symptoms of any diseases acquired in
India.
46 That was a very real danger; among the many members of the Tibetan’s party who
had become ill on the journey was the Panchen Lama’s uncle, who died of malaria in
Darjeeling. He had, however, failed to take the medicines provided by Steen, and the
Gyantsediary,inheadmasterlytone,claimsthat‘‘TheLamaandotherTibetansthoroughly




wentto India, and on his return to Tibet Steen reported that he had held a lengthy conserva-
tionwiththePanchen‘‘chieflyaboutmedicaltopicsandrifles.’’Henotedthat‘‘Inregardto
the former, he expressed a wish that I might introduce vaccinations into Shigatse’’.
48
We need, however, to treat these British reports with some caution; it was common
practice for the imperial officers to persuade indigenous rulers to agree to, or to adopt,
a particular policy favoured by the imperial power, but to attribute the credit for the
44OIOC MSS Eur F157–224, Bhutan diary
of R Kennedy 1909–10, entry of 9 Jan. 1910;
see also Alex McKay, ‘British-Indian Medical
Service Officers in Bhutan, 1905–1947: a historical
outline’, in Karma Ura and Sonam Kinga (eds),
The spider and the piglet: Proceedings of the first
International Seminar on Bhutan Studies,
Thimphu (Bhutan), The Centre for Bhutan
Studies, 2004; also available online at
www.bhutanstudies.org.bt/publications/spdr-pglt/
spdr-pglt.htm.
45McKay, op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 17–39.
46NAI FD, Secret E, May 1906, 47–76, Diary of
Captain Steen at Shigatse, entry of 26 Feb. 1906; see
alsoSatisChandraArcharyya,TheTashiLama’svisitto
India, Calcutta, Government Printing office, 1907.
47NAI FD, Secret E, May 1906, 47–76, Gyantse
diary entry of 18 Jan. 1906.
48NAI FD, Secret E, May 1906, 47–76, Diary of
Captain Steen at Shigatse, entry of 26 Feb. 1906.
The Panchen Lama sought British weaponry to bolster
his political position.
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Steen had in any case already instituted a vaccination programme in Gyantse, nearly
a year before his ‘‘discussion’’ with the PanchenLama.Around 1May 1905, localemploy-
ees,servantsandfollowersattachedtotheGyantseAgencywerevaccinated.Subsequently,
as Steen reported:
The Jongpen [local administrator] and leading men of the town and district were then approached
and the methods and value of vaccination fully explained to them. Some had heard of it, others had
not, but all agreed that it would be a great blessing if such a terrible disease could be prevented.
Since then these leading men have rendered great assistance by explaining the nature of vaccination
to their people and encouraging them to come forward.
50
Steen trained three Tibetans in vaccination and by 31 December 1905, 1,320 children had
been vaccinated in Gyantse and the surrounding neighbourhood.
51 Vaccination in and
around Gyantse continued until December 1906, when the local Chinese representative
suddenly claimed that this programme constituted British interference in Tibet’s internal
affairs. Although his claim rested on the objection that vaccination was compulsory,
52 and
was only one of a number of objections to British activities in Gyantse that he raised at the
time, the Government of India accepted the need to avoid any suggestion of such inter-
ference, and vaccination ceased.
53
In April 1907, however, the local administrators in western Tibet requested the
assistance of British Indian vaccinators to control an outbreak of smallpox there, and
vaccination resumed at Gyantse late in 1907.
54 That the Chinese objections were part
of a larger struggle to expel the British from Tibet is further indicated by the fact that in
September 1908 the Chinese amban ordered the vaccination of all Tibetans.
55 In other
words, the Chinese objections were not to vaccination itself but to the British sponsoring
the vaccination.
When the British resumed their vaccination programme in 1907, it was carried out
by two Tibetans whom they had trained (although it is unclear if these were the same
men trained by Steen). In the 1909–10 year this pair carriedout 389 vaccinations,
56 and the
Gyantse Medical Officer confidently reported that the next outbreak of smallpox
would demonstrate the efficacy of vaccination.
57 He seemed to be proved right in the
following year when an outbreak of smallpox caused numerous deaths in Lhasa and
49On departing Tibet, Steen did, however,
receive a personal letter from the Panchen Lama
regretting his departure; OIOC L/P&S/7/203–1162,
GAR, 1 April 1906–31 March 1907.
50NAI FD, External B, May 1906, 156–158,
R Steen to W F O’Connor, 14 Dec. 1905.
51OIOC, MSS Eur F157–304b, GAR, 1906.
52That vaccination was compulsory was denied by
theBritishandthiswasneverofficialpolicy.Giventhat
the co-operation of local e ´lites was secured prior to
vaccinating villages etc., it is, however, possible, that
some degree of coercion, if only social, was involved.
53NAI FD, Secret E, Feb. 1907, 295–353, various
correspondence.
54NAI FD, Secret E, June 1907, 375–389, various
correspondence; FD, External B, June 1911, 289,
various correspondence.
55NAI FD, External B, Oct. 1908, 194–216,
Gyantse diary entry of 10 Sept. 1908. Chinese medical
initiatives in this period do not appear to have been
implemented in actuality, and the collapse of the
Manchu dynasty after 1910 ended the official Chinese
presence in Tibet.
56OIOC L/P&S/7/241–1058, GAR, 1 April
1909–31 March 1910.
57OIOC L/P&S/7/229–923, dispensary report for
the period 1 April 1908–31 March 1909.
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Alex McKayShigatse, but few in Gyantse. The number of vaccinations carried out that year leapt to
2,131,asmightbeexpected.Butthesefiguresconcealdifficultieswiththevaccinators.The
twoTibetanswerefoundtobetakingbribesnottovaccinatepeople,andweresacked.Only
one suitable candidate was found to replace them, and he died soon after in Shigatse of
unspecified causes while vaccinating there.
58
The British sources generally paint a bright picture of Tibetans keen to embrace vacci-
nation. Thus in reports around the time of this outbreak we read that the
Tibetans are very appreciative of the value of vaccination; during one month representatives from
villages, many of them five days journey from Gyantse, came to hospital to say that smallpox was
raging with them, and asking that the vaccinator be sent out.
59
But a subsequent report clarified the nature of the Tibetans’ enthusiasm for vaccination.
They were, it stated, ‘‘reluctant to undergo vaccination unless the disease is actually
amongst them’’.
60
Thus, amidst the confident and optimistic accounts of biomedical progress in Tibet,
there are indications that, as in India, there was some indigenous resistance to the smallpox
inoculation process in Tibet. The fact that the vaccinators were being bribed not to
vaccinate people also lends weight to the Chinese allegation that some form of coercion
was used in the process.
61
Steen had felt it necessary to emphasize that:
No compulsion of any kind, it is needless to say, was resorted to. When the people saw that the
application of the vaccine caused little or no discomfort and when they understood that the measure
was intended to prevent smallpox the children were brought forward quite voluntarily.
62
Similarly, in official correspondence, the Panchen Lama’s acceptance of vaccination was
frequently quoted as evidence of Tibetan acceptance, as was the request from the western
Tibetan authorities in April 1907. But an obituary of Lieutenant-Colonel Kennedy (which
was apparently written by a contemporary British agent in Gyantse), notes that Kennedy
‘‘also vaccinated a large number of the local inhabitants, at first by guile and persuasion,
but later at their urgent request’’.
63
While the British sources also describe a Tibetan reluctance to undergo hospitalization,
surgery under anaesthetic, and continuing treatment for venereal disease after the elim-
ination of immediate symptoms, no other aspect of biomedical practice appears to have
encountered such active resistance as vaccination. In the absence of Tibetan sources, their
perspective is difficult to analyse. Tibetans did not have the gender and caste purity
concerns that affected the issue in India.
64 Tibetan women were not socially isolated
58OIOC L/P&S/7/249–1151, GAR, 1 April
1910–31 March 1911; OIOC L/P&S/7/241–1058
GAR, 1 April 1909–31 March 1910.
59OIOC L/P&S/7/249–1151, dispensary report for
the year ending 31 Dec. 1911.
60OIOC L/P&S/10/218–2396, dispensary report
for the year ending 31 Dec. 1914.
61In 1908, vaccination was made compulsory
in Sikkim, where the British had a controlling
influence overthe local government; OIOC L/P&S/10/
92–1289, Sikkim annual report, 1908–9.
62OIOC MSS Eur F157–304b, GAR, 1906.
63OIOC MSS Eur F157–224a, obituary contained
in Kennedy to Bailey correspondence; presumably
by F M Bailey, whose long service on the frontier
included a posting as Gyantse Trade Agent, 1907–9.
Emphasis added.
64Unfortunately the British medical reports do not
provide any figures concerning the gender of those
inoculated.
147
The IMS Dispensary in Gyantse (Tibet), 1904–1910fromcontactwithmenandthustheirstatuswasnot,asitwasinIndia,threatenedbycontact
with a male vaccinator. Nor did Tibetan society base social gradations around notions of
purity and impurity in the manner of the Indian caste system, where the introduction of a
cultivated serum into the high-caste body threatened loss of caste status.
65
Given that Tibet was not under British imperial control, it is also difficult to locate a
Tibetan parallel to the relationship between nationalism and resistance to biomedicine that
developed in India. There was a clearly distinguishable Tibetan identity historically based
around elements such as shared dress, diet, language, and mythologies such as the Gesar of
Ling saga. But this was generally only expressed vis-a `-vis a foreign ‘‘other’’ in a society
where the primary identity was local or regional. Thus the Tibetans at that time lacked a
sense of nationalism in the modern understanding of that term as linked to the European
concept of a ‘‘nation-state’’; one with fixed borders and a single political authority holding
a monopoly over state use of force and relations with foreign powers. ‘‘Tibet’’ included
enclaves under foreign authority, and a variety of political and administrative formations
that contested centralizing power and carried out dealings with foreign powers without
reference to Lhasa.
66
Tibetan resistance to vaccination may be best located in the indigenous context of
resistance to innovation, for Tibetan society at that time was overwhelmingly conservative
and resistance to innovation was characteristic.
67 This is not to be understood in such
simplistic terms as a ‘‘static’’ or ‘‘traditional’’ society but was rather an expression of an
active and articulated policy deriving from a particular Buddhist world-view of Tibet as
the home of Buddhism under the special protection of the Bodhisattva Avalokite  s svara,
and thus as an ideal land. Resistance was therefore, not to vaccination as ‘‘foreign’’, or as
an expression of a colonial power relationship, but rather to altering the status quo as
established by the Buddha. In that sense it was a religious objection.
Adding to the potential for resistance in the Tibetan reception of biomedicine was the
fact that the main preservers of the existing social structure were the monastic powers,
among whose ranks, as we have noted, were those whose income (and status) derived from
their knowledge and skilful practice of the Tibetan medical system. With the influence
which the monasteries enjoyed throughout Tibetan society, these monks were potential
65See David Arnold, ‘Touching the body:
perspectives on the Indian plague, 1896–1900’,
in Subaltern Studies V, ed. R Guha, New Delhi, 1987,
reprintedinSelectedSubalternStudies,ed.RGuhaand
G Spivak, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988,
pp. 391–427, esp. pp. 396–400. In this and works such
ashisColonizingthebody:statemedicineandepidemic
disease in nineteenth-century India (Berkeley,
University of California Press, 1993), Arnold largely
initiated analysis of the complexities of the Indian
reception of British medical initiatives. See also
Fre ´de ´rique Marglin, ‘Smallpox in two systems of
knowledge’, in Fre ´de ´rique and Stephen Marglin (eds),
Dominating knowledge: development, culture, and
resistance, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2001 (first
published in 1990), pp. 102–44, where the author
readsresistance tobothcolonialandpost-colonialstate
vaccination campaigns as political resistance ‘‘in the
nameofthegoddessofsmallpox’’against‘‘logocentric
structuresofpower’’.Herbizarrebeliefthat‘‘Smallpox
need not have been eradicated; it could have been
controlled’’ is unlikely, however, to find supporters
among those who have actually witnessed, or suffered,
the effects of the disease.
66For an extended discussion of the issue of
Tibetannationalisminthiscontext,seeMcKay,op.cit.,
note 3 above, pp. 196–211. Works of note on Tibetan
identity include Geoffrey Samuel, Civilized shamans,
Washington, DC, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993;
and P Christian Klieger, Tibetan nationalism: the
role of patronage in the accomplishment of a national
identity, Berkeley, Folklore Institute, 1992.
67For the predominantly conservative nature of
Tibetan society, this is best illustrated in the political
context by the work of Goldstein, op. cit., note 28
above.
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Alex McKayleaders of opposition to biomedicine (and other aspects of modernization) and where the
British sources do indicate resistance to their medical innovations, it is the monks who are
blamed. The 1911 report, for example, states:
This comparatively few number of patients is explained by the opposition of the Lamas, who put
obstacles in the way of people coming for treatment. The reason is not far to seek, as the dispensary
interferes with the fees of the Lamas who are exorcists for all manner of ghosts and demons to
whom disease and even injury are universally ascribed.
68
There was a general tendency for the British to demonize the collective body known as
‘‘the monks’’ and to attribute all Tibetan resistance to them, rather than to acknowledge
broader socio-economic concerns. In practice, the British distinguished those monks—
in particular the e ´lites such as the Panchen Lama—with whom they established good
relations. But they recognized that the core of opposition to their presence came from the
monastic community, whose status their modernization project threatened.
69
While monastic opposition was part of a wider political problem for the British, it was
also an issue of genuine medical concern to the IMS officers. They found that it was only
when the monks ‘‘have experimented and failed that the patients come to the dispensary.
The result is that some of the cases are very serious’’.
70 This problem was to be common
throughout the British period, but particularly in these early years it seemed that Tibetan
patients, or their indigenous physicians, often—or generally—used biomedicine as a
strategy of last resort.
The advice of a monastic physician, novelty, chance, or economic circumstance may all
have led Tibetan patients to resort to the IMS dispensaries. But while receiving biomedical
treatment, many of the patients doubtless continued with indigenous therapies, particularly
in regard to the religio-medical aspects of their understanding of disease causation, and
their uptake of the new system was selective. The evidence for the Tibetans’ continuing
resort to indigenous practitioners suggests that we might need to read the records of
treatment at biomedical facilities as indicative not of overall local health patterns,
but only as a record of those conditions Tibetans regarded as best treated within the
biomedical system.
The increasing attendance at the IMS dispensaries does suggest, however, that the
efficacyofbiomedicineatleastinregardtospecificconditionssuchassmallpoxorcataract
surgery gradually came to be acknowledged by the Tibetans.
71 Modern anthropological
studiesindicatethatHimalayanpatientsmayregardbiomedicineaseffectiveintheworldly
sphere but continue with indigenous practices regarded as effective in the other-worldly
68OIOC L/P&S/7/241–1058, GAR, 1 April
1909–31 March 1910.
69On the wider political context of British
relations with the Panchen Lama in this period,
see McKay op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 18–42.
The British sources do not, however, provide evidence
for the extent to which local politics can be seen to
have configured the reception of biomedicine either
in Gyantse in this period, or later in Lhasa.
Individual patients or local supporters are rarely
referred to.
70OIOC L/P&S/7/249–1151, GAR, 1 April
1910–31 March 1911; L/P&S/7/249–1151,
dispensary report for the year ending
31 Dec. 1911.
71Resistance to vaccination had largely
vanished by the 1920s, when there were a number
of examples of Tibetan state uptake of
vaccination; see OIOC; L/P&S/10/218–2120
dispensary report for the year ending 31 Dec. 1922
and L/P&S/10/218–2418, dispensary report for
the year ending 31 Dec. 1923. As early as 1913,
a group of Nepalese vaccinators found it profitable
enough to travel around vaccinating people for a
small fee. OIOC, L/P&S/10/218–2684, dispensary
report for the year ending 31 Dec. 1913.
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72 and this may well have been the case with the Tibetans at that time. The ultimate
result, however, was increasing Tibetan resort to, and familiarity with, the concepts of
biomedicine.
In this early period there is no evidence for the interaction between the Tibetan and
biomedical systems that was to develop in the late colonial period and which has been a
feature of more recent medical history. There was no official communication or interface
between the systems and little in the way of private initiatives. Biomedicine was culturally
foreign to the vast majority of Tibetans, and this early period saw multiple elements of
resistance to that foreign system, albeit that that resistance was not expressed in terms
closely equating to that arising in India. Yet whether for reasons of cost, efficacy, or as a
part of the wider process of the introduction of modernity, biomedicine did slowly increase
in popularity between 1905 and 1910, paving the way for further Tibetan uptake of that
system in later years.
Issues of Planning
Effective medical treatment obviously required medical staff who could communicate
with their Tibetan patients. But although IMS officers were required to have learned an
Indian language they were not expected to know Tibetan when they arrived there. Steen
seems to have learned some Tibetan, but even he engaged a Hindi-speaking Tibetan as an
interpreter, and after his successor, Lieutenant F H Stewart, reported that neither he nor his
Hospital Assistant spoke any Tibetan,
73 the interpreter’s position was made a permanent
one. Although Stewart’s successor, Lieutenant Robert Kennedy, did come to acquire a
good knowledge of Tibetan, Kennedy also used an interpreter when he began his service in
Gyantse.
74
Mere competence in Tibetan and Hindi was not enough to qualify an interpreter, how-
ever; class issues were also involved. O’Connor’s application for the permanent services of
aninterpreterfortheGyantsehospitalgaveoneessentialqualificationforhismedicalwork,
that ‘‘the interpreter [be] of respectable birth, and attainments’’.
75 As Stewart explained,
It is ... highly desirable for the extension of friendly relations with the people that the Medical
Officer should be in a position to be consulted by the better class of Tibetans. To have to employ a
man of the coolie class as interpreter in regard to their private affairs would be sufficient to entirely
prohibit such consultation.
76
O’Connor and Stewart went on to suggest that a suitably educated Tibetan employed
as an interpreter could also be further trained in the intricacies of Tibetan
official correspondence etiquette, and would thus be ‘‘fitted for other Government
72See, for example, Martin Gaenszle, ‘The shaman
and the doctor: conflicting systems of interpretation
and diagnosis in East Nepal’, in D Sich and
W Gottschalk (eds), Acculturation and domination
in traditional Asian medical systems, Stuttgart,
Franz Steiner, 1994, pp. 53–60, esp. p. 56.
73NAI FD, External B, April 1907, 32–33,
Lt. F H Stewart to Trade Agent Gyantse,
8 Jan. 1907.
74Major Francis Hugh Stewart, born Galasheils
1879, educated St Andrews and Edinburgh, IMS
1904–21; Lt-Col. Robert Siggins Kennedy, DSO, MC,
born Ireland 1882, educated Queen’s College Cork,
IMS 1906–23. Kennedy later spent nearly a
year in Lhasa with the Political Officer Charles
Bell in 1921.
75NAI FD, External B, April 1907, 32–33,
W F O’Connor to the Political Officer Sikkim,
12 Jan. 1907.
76NAI FD, External B, April 1907, 32–33,




77 This question of locating suitable intermediaries had long been an issue
that concerned the British in their dealings with Tibet. Communication between the two
cultures, British and Tibetan, required the use of local intermediaries who were familiar
with both cultures, and who could explain one to the other. Attempts to develop suitable
intermediaries had begun as early as 1874, when the Bhutia Boarding school was estab-
lished in Darjeeling to train local Tibetan-speaking youths as ‘‘interpreters, geographers
and explorers, who may be useful if at any future time Tibet is opened to the British’’.
78
The Bhutiaschool project did notprove asuccess,however. None ofthe youths from the
school was ‘‘found to be of any real service, either as interpreter or in any other capacity’’
on the Younghusband mission, and O’Connor now suggested employing suitable Tibetans
at Gyantse and training them to serve the British.
79
The question of education was to prove crucial. Both the modernization project and
the practical needs of day-to-day operations in the Gyantse hospital required that upper-
class Tibetans should take up the practice of biomedicine. In Tibet, as in Sikkim, Bhutan
and elsewhere, the British frontier officers wanted to see indigenous youths trained in the
dominant Western medical system. The officials understood medical science as a bene-
ficent and universally applicable system of truths, and the modernization of Tibet, seen by
the British asbothinevitableanda process tobeencouraged, requiredthe indigenization of
biomedicine. Local practitioners, once trained by the British, could then inaugurate the
development of a Tibetan public health system, with medical education and training itself
becoming indigenized.
At that time, however, Tibetan trainees were hardly likely to be of immediate value in
the medical field because training in Western biomedicine essentially required a Western
education. Tibetans educated in Tibet learned an entirely different world-view to that
inculcated even by British education in India and at that time there were no resident
Tibetans with a Western education. The usual processes by which biomedical practitioners
were trained were therefore absent, and the introduction of Western education to Tibet
was clearly an essential first step towards producing Tibetan biomedical practitioners.
A series of rather unsuccessful initiatives in that direction were thus promoted by the
British during the ensuing decades.
80
Imperial government, however, was not always as enthusiastic about such grand
schemes as its ‘‘men-on-the-spot’’. Both financial considerations and wider global con-
cerns acted as a brake on such plans. Thus, as early as December 1904, O’Connor sug-
gested that four young Tibetans be trained in medical work, initially in the Gyantse clinic,
77NAI FD, External B, April 1907, 32–33,
W F O’Connor to the Political Officer Sikkim,
12 Jan. 1907.
78A W Croft, Director of Public Instruction,
toACLyall,ForeignDepartment,Simla,18April1879;
NAI FD, Proceedings, Secret, Jan. 1882, 722–25,
quoted in Derek Waller, The pundits: British
exploration of Tibet and Central Asia, Lexington,
UniversityPressofKentucky,1990,p.193note3,p.292.
79NAI FD, External B, April 1907, 32–33,
W F O’Connor to the Political Officer in Sikkim,
12 Jan. 1907.
80Four Tibetan youths were sent to Rugby
school in England in 1914; the experiment
was not repeated. An English school existed in
Gyantse in the period 1923–26; it was closed
as part of a general Tibetan movement against
modernization at that time. An English school
opened in Lhasa in the 1940s but was also
short-lived, although by this time some Tibetans
were sending their children to Western schools
in India.
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affairs and fearful of upsetting China, eventually replied only that ‘‘you should avail
yourself of any opportunity that may occur for encouraging the Tibetan authorities to
send students to India for medical training without appearing to press them to do so’’.
81
In the event, circumstances prevented O’Connor from proceeding with this plan and the
eventual failure of the Tibetans to modernize their social system meant that at the time of
the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950 there were apparently no indigenous Tibetans
qualified in the practice of biomedicine.
British initiatives to stimulate the development of an indigenous biomedical tradition in
Tibet continued, however. In 1909 it was proposed to train twoSikkimese Bhutia youths in
medicine for future employment in Tibet. The Bhutias of Sikkim were ethnically Tibetan,
and the Political Officer in Sikkim, Charles Bell, reported that ‘‘there will ... be con-
siderablepoliticaladvantagetobederivedfromshowingthepeopleofTibetpeopleoftheir
own race doing medical work after being trained in a medical college in India’’.
82 Two
Sikkimese youths were eventually trained as Sub-Assistant Surgeons and posted to Tibet
during the First World War. One of these, Bo Tsering, subsequently served in the British
hospitals in Tibet for more than thirty years.
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Race was also a factor in the selection of staff for the Gyantse hospital. When Steen’s
normal two-year term in Gyantse ended, there were moves to replace him with one Captain
D P Goil (an Indian). But a key factor in the British understanding of the basis of their
power in India was their belief in prestige as an economical weapon with which to protect
their imperial possessions. They believed that if the power and honour of the empire was
projected strongly enough to its subjects then the empire would be seen as invincible and
resistance to it as futile. Considerable importance was thus attached to the maintenance
of British prestige, with considerable time devoted to considering the effects of various
actions on that prestige. One conclusion the British reached was that no matter how
effective an Indian might be professionally, he could not uphold the prestige of the empire
to the extent that a British officer could; only a British officer could project and maintain
the prestige considered essential in a political position.
84 Thus it was concluded that on
‘‘political grounds it is important that the Medical Officer in a pioneer post like Gyantse
should be a European’’,
85 and in October 1906 Steen was replaced by a Scotsman,
Lieutenant (later Major) Stewart.
81NAI FD, External B, May 1905, 258–59,
W F O’Connor to Government of India,
18 Dec. 1904, and reply of 16 May 1905.
82NAI FD, 1909 Internal B, June 57–58,
C Bell to Government of India, 6 April 1909.
83OIOC L/P&S/10/218–2593, dispensary report
for the year ending 31 Dec. 1916. Bo Tsering
(d. 1953) was a Gangtok Sikkimese whose father
worked for the local ruler. It is interesting to
note that there was a large increase in the numbers of
Tibetans attending the Gyantse hospital after Bo
Tsering became Gyantse Medical Officer in December
1915. (His appointment was due to wartime shortages
of personnel, and he remained in the post until a
European medical officer replaced him in 1922.)
Tsering attributed the increase to the growing
popularity of the biomedical facility, but it may be
that the Tibetans actually felt more comfortable
consulting a Sikkimese medical practitioner.
(The Sikkimese aristocracy is of Tibetan origin.)
84McKay, op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 143–47.
85NAI FD, 1906 External A, Dec., 31–38,
file note by V Gabriel, 16 July 1906. The use of
Indians in any positions of responsibility in Tibet
was ruled out by the Sikkim Political Officer
in the following terms; ‘‘Indians are handicapped
by their inability to speak Tibetan, by the
difference of their religion and by their ignorance
of the habits of the people’’; OIOC L/P&S/7/229–923,
GAR, 1 April 1908–31 March 1909, cover
note by Charles Bell, 11 May 1909. The British
were, of course, similarly handicapped, but
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While Gyantse was the centre of British medical activities in Tibet during the period
under consideration, two smaller medical establishments had also been created after the
Younghusband mission. One was a clinic at Yatung, in the Chumbi valley just over the
borderfromSikkim,andthe othera dispensaryatfar-offGartok,inwesternTibet, atwhich
places the British had opened smaller Trade Agencies. In addition, a dispensary was
opened at Phari, north of the Chumbi, in August 1905.
86 The medical establishments
attheselocationswere generallyunderthechargeofanIndianHospitalAssistant,although
during the initial period when the Chumbi valley was still occupied by British forces an
IMS officer, Captain O’Leary, was in overall charge there.
Whereas in Sikkim the initial establishment of an imperial medical centre at the capital
of Gangtok had been followed by the gradual dissemination of dispensaries throughout
rural centres, Phari remained the only addition to British biomedical establishments in
Tibet until the 1930s. Both economic restrictions and political considerations acted against
any such British medical expansion, as did competition from Chinese plans for controlling
the modernization of Tibet (albeit along the Western scientific lines that China herself was
taking up).
Despite its gradual increase in popularity among the population at large, there
appear to have been no moves by the Tibetans to introduce any form of biomedicine
at state level. Their first public health initiative came only after the expulsion of
the Chinese from Tibet in 1912, with the opening of a public hospital within the
Men-se-Khang college in Lhasa in 1916.
87 Medical services there were provided free
of cost,
88 but treatment was solely with indigenous Tibetan medicine. While this initiative
did help to establish the hospital system within Tibetan understanding,
89 and the institute
survives in a different incarnation both in Lhasa and in the exile capital of Dharamsala
(north India), no Tibetans appear to have taken up biomedical practice prior to the Chinese
take-over of Tibet in 1950.
The British medical post at Gyantse was handed over to the successor Indian Govern-
ment at independence in August 1947. A total of 23 medical officers served in Gyantse
during the 1904–47 period, latterly including a number of Indian officers as the European
component of the IMS gradually declined. After 1936–37, however, when the British
established a permanent mission at the Tibetan capital, Lhasa, Gyantse’s importance
was diminished as the Lhasa mission became the centre of British activity in Tibet.
assumed their superior ability to surmount these
difficulties. Indians were later employed
inTibet,mostnotablyasMedicalOfficersinGyantsein
the 1940s.
86NAI FD, External B, Aug. 1905, 227–228,
various correspondence.
87The initiative for this hospital appears to have
come from the Dalai Lama, who in a reversal of his
previous flight, had gone into exile in British India in
1910 to escape Chinese domination. There he came
undertheauthorityofthePoliticalOfficerCharlesBell,
who apparently influenced him to experiment with a
numberofaspectsofmodernityonhisreturntoTibetin
1913. The beneficent aspect of a public hospital would
naturally have appealed to Buddhist sensibilities.
88Rechung Rinpoche, op. cit., note 10, p. 25.
89Geoffrey Samuel, ‘Tibetan medicine in
contemporary India: theory and practice’,
in L H Connor and G Samuel (eds), Healing powers
and modernity: traditional medicine, shamanism,
and science in Asian societies, Westport,
Connecticut/London, Bergin & Garvey, 2001,
pp. 261–3.
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The British medical endeavour in Tibet was very much a part of the political project
there. Butareadingofthe sources fortheentire periodoftheBritishpresenceinTibetfrom
1904 to 1947 indicates that just as the success of the political project was limited, so too
was the spirit of optimism that pervades the early British medical reports to be largely
unfounded. The Tibetans only gradually took up biomedicine, and continued resistance to
it by the monastic powers is recorded even in the 1940s.
Yet the 1905–10 era was, none the less, one in which significant numbers of (central)
Tibetans first became acquainted with biomedicine, and came to regard certain aspects of
that system as in some way efficacious. This selective uptake of specific elements of
biomedicine suggests that Tibetans were carefully evaluating the worth of the new system
and identifying those conditions for which resort to biomedicine was most beneficial.
There was, however, a continuing faith in the indigenous system, which seems to have
remained thefirstresort,andconservativeresistancetothemorebodilyintrusiveaspectsof
biomedicine.
The British efforts to promote biomedicine may have been restricted by problems of
language and by the limitations on the medical services they could provide, and given that
the British had invaded Tibet in 1903–4, the Tibetans’ evaluation of the new system may
have been affected by the political context of the encounter. But the conservative tenden-
cies of Tibetan society in that era were probably the major factor in the slow uptake of
biomedicine.
The question of whether experimentation with the new system was stimulated by its
being free of cost remains problematic. But certainly the Tibetan consumer should not
be understood as a passive recipient of biomedicine, or entirely under the influence of
the monastic powers. Particularly among the poor, individuals may well have taken up
biomedicineforeconomicreasons,andparticularlyinthisperiodwhenthestateauthorities
had so recently been swept aside by outside power, some questioning or even resistance to
the traditional systems and authorities may have manifested in experiments with bio-
medicine.
With training in the biomedical system requiring the world-view imparted by a Western
education, the medical modernization process in Tibet could not proceed in the period
under consideration. Nor is there any evidence of any real interaction between the two
systemsatthistime;thatwasonlytoemergeinthefollowingdecades.Butdespitealimited
geographical impact, the developments in Gyantse in this period do mark the beginning of
the Tibetan encounter with state biomedical systems, and the earliest systematic efforts to
introduce biomedicine into Tibet.
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